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Religious Determinants of Socio-Political Openness  
of Young Silesians in Poland
Abstract: The aim of the presented study was to diagnose the role of religious engagement 
in the social attitudes of young Silesians, operationalized on the continuum of closeness vs. 
openness in three areas: (1) community engagement, (2) approval for religion’s interference 
in the public space, and (3) accepting Catholic Church hierarchs’ views on problems such as 
euthanasia, artificial contraception, homosexual relationships and in vitro fertilization. The 
group defined in the presented study is young (age: 16–19) Silesians from Śląskie (Silesian) 
Province, for whom religion is one of the fundamental values and is regarded by scholars as 
the core of their identity (N=567). The results of the study confirm that religious engage-
ment is a significant predictor of a closed social attitude in two out of three areas proposed 
in the model. Higher religious engagement promotes the desire to incorporate the approved 
religious principles into the secular space. Religious engagement is also a significant predic-
tor of acceptance of Catholic Church hierarchs’ views on underlined problems. The analysis 
did not show any significant relationships between religious engagement in community en-
gagement of young Silesians.
Keywords: religiosity in Poland, religious engagement, community engagement, young 
Silesians
Introduction
Religiosity in Poland has a special character, resulting from over 1,000 years of bond between 
religion and the state, but also from modern events (Turska-Kawa, Wojtasik, 2017A), such 
as (1) almost five decades of communism in the 20th century history of Poland, when the 
USSR enforced a totalitarian political system eradicating religion from the public sphere; 
(2) the appointment of cardinal Karol Wojtyła as the pope John Paul II in 1978; and system 
transformation in which the Church played a special role, supporting democratic opposi-
tion circles and being an active intermediary of establishing all the stages and the course of 
democratization processes. The country’s history and natural social influences in the period 
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of formation of the state have led to the development of a relatively homogeneous religious 
and national social structure in Poland, which is nowadays more and more often disproved by 
research (CBOS, 2012; CBOS, 2015B; Mariański, 2013; Turska-Kawa, Wojtasik, 2017B). 
Exploring the subject of the paper is determined, i.a., by the results of research on 
the motivational factor of religious engagement1. Researchers agree that religion plays 
a significant motivational role in the social sphere, but the conclusions from the research 
are twofold. On the one hand, the analyses prove that religious engagement strengthens 
social and communal competence. Research results show that religion mobilizes people 
to engage in social and political activity, determining their involvement and ways of its 
expression (Musick, Wilson 2008: 279; Aghazadeh, Mahmoudoghli 2017). Others, however, 
stress that religious activity may reduce the level of social openness and social and political 
engagement (Turska-Kawa, Wojtasik, 2014, pp. 6–23; Storm, 2015, pp. 14–29; Marszałek-
Kawa, Plecka, 2018).
The aim of this study is to diagnose the direction of influence of young people’s religious 
involvement on three planes: their community activity, consent to religion’s interference in 
the public sphere, and approval for the restrictive views of Catholic Church hierarchs on 
issues such as euthanasia, artificial contraception, homosexual relationships and in vitro 
fertilization. Individuals’ attitudes and views in these areas are the expression of their social 
openness. Civil engagement requires certain communal competence, the desire to cooperate, 
voluntary action for the benefit of other people, and indirectly also trust. Including in the 
analysis the approval for religion’s interference in the public sphere results from the specific 
relationship between those planes in Poland. Firstly, apart from religious functions, the 
Catholic Church has always been a strongly politicized institution. The alliance between the 
throne and the altar gave it a privileged position in social relationships. Secondly, in the past, 
Church hierarchs came from the most prominent aristocratic families, often implementing 
in their activity the political strategies of princely or magnate families. Accepting the holistic 
interference of religion in politics will be an expression of a less open attitude of individuals 
who pursue to close the social and political space in the framework of familiar and stable 
system of religious values. Catholic Church hierarchs’ views on issues such as euthanasia, 
artificial contraception, homosexual relationships and in vitro fertilization is very restrictive 
1 Activation or withdrawal generated by religious engagement results from the nature of religious 
system, which is based on values. Most theories assume that values serve the motivational function and 
involve a high emotional load. Referring to classic authors, Milton Rokeach (1973) identifies values as 
beliefs with an emotional aspect which affect one’s choice of goals and ways of achieving them. According to 
Shalom Schwartz (1992, p. 4), values are concepts or beliefs which refer, not only to specific situations, but 
to ultimate states or behaviors. Values determine the choice or evaluation of behaviors and events and are 
organized in accordance with their relative importance. Many empirical studies analyze the relationships 
between values (including the religious system with its different expressions) and social attitudes and 
behaviors, evidencing a significant relationship between them.
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and regularly referred to in public discussions in Poland. The support for these views will 
be an expression of a closed attitude, contradicting liberal values.
The group defined in the presented study is young Silesians from Śląskie (Silesian) 
Province. Many studies prove that religion is regarded as one of the fundamental values 
and the core of Silesians’ identity (Bukowska-Floreńska, 2007; Świątkiewicz, 2007; Swadźba, 
2012, 2014A). The religiosity of each individual develops in a specific environment, where 
a specific culture and a specific religion co-occur. Empirical research shows that the family 
environment has the fundamental influence on the shaping of a young person’s religiosity. 
This influence is associated with the principles upheld in the family, relationships between its 
members based on these principles, the prevalent views of God, and the family atmosphere 
(Stepulak, 2010, pp. 207–236; Zaręba, 2010, pp. 14–16; Zych, 2012, p. 120). In the context 
of the study, it is interesting whether the classic values pointed out in literature play an 
important role in the lives of young Silesians too, activating and moderating their socio-
political attitudes. Interest in the young generation of Silesians is also connected with the new 
trends described in literature. For example, interesting results emerge from the report from 
the nationwide study IRCENTER (carried out with the CAVI method), which shows how 
the Silesian national identity is currently perceived by the youngest Silesians as compared 
to older residents of the region. For people under 24 years of age, Silesian national identity 
is mostly associated with the “go-ahead” attitude, “the tendency to have fun” or “creativity”, 
while those aged 60+ point to “industriousness”, “respect for history and tradition”, “frugality” 
and “hospitality” as the appreciated Silesian qualities. Other age groups express ideas similar 
to those mentioned by the oldest group (IRCENTER, 2015). These trends are related to the 
transformations occurring in Silesia. “For young people, cultural transformation in Silesia 
is a kind of game played with the Silesian tradition, while for Silesia, it means the ‘radical 
de-Silesianization of the town and the whole region’” (Oslislo-Piekarska, 2015, p. 21). Many 
young Silesians have had the experience of traveling or working abroad, know Europe 
better, and use it as a model to imitate. For them, the world is an inspiration to change and 
improve the local conditions. They often prefer to adopt the local and regional identification 
rather than the national one, and at the same time, they regard themselves as Europeans 
(Oslislo-Piekarska, 2015, p. 59).
(De-)motivational Aspects of Religious Engagement
On the one hand, researchers prove that religious engagement strengthens social and com-
munal competence. The religious factor plays an important role in linking religious axiology 
with social values (Leege, 1993, pp. 3–26) and in socialization functions of religious institu-
tions (Greenberg, 2000, p. 377–394; Jones-Correa & Leal, 2001, p. 751–770). Research results 
show that religion mobilizes people to engage in social and political activity, determining 
their engagement and ways of its expression (Musick, Wilson, 2008, p. 279; Aghazadeh, 
Mahmoudoghli, 2017). In the USA, religiosity and regular participation in church services 
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correlated with higher indices of voter turnout (Miller, Wattenberg, 1984, pp. 301–317; Verba, 
Schlozman, Brady, 1995, p. 434; Wuthnow, 2003, pp. 423–442), political interests, voluntary 
membership in organizations (Smidt, 1999, pp. 185–187; Ruiter, DeGraaf, 2006, p. 197), or 
voluntary and charity activity (Greeley, 2001; Ruiter, DeGraff, 2006; Putnam, Campbell, 2010). 
In addition, active participation in church community contributed to the improvement of 
individual social competence, communication and organizational skills (Verba, Schlozman, 
Brady, 1995, pp. 320–330, 378, 444; Smidt 1999, p. 178). A Canadian study, in turn, proves 
stronger relations between religiosity and regular participation in church services and activ-
ity in voluntary organizations, charity work and voluntary work (Gidengil, Blais, Nadeau, 
2004, p. 161; Bowen, 2004; Reed, Selbee, 2000, pp. 571–592; Smidt, 1999). In Poland research 
carried out as part of the General Polish Electoral Study quite consistently shows positive 
relationships between participation in religious practices and the likelihood of taking part 
in elections (Cześnik, 2009, p. 26). 
An opposite view stresses the possibility that religious activity may reduce the level 
of social openness (Wuthenow, 1999, pp. 331–363), the competitive character of citizens’ 
trust in their own religious group at the expense of general social capital (Uslaner, 2000, pp. 
569–590; Daniels & der Ruhr, 2010; Storm, 2015, pp. 14–29), or even the fact that religious 
activity lowers citizens’ knowledge and social competence (Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard 2003, 
pp. 300–324). Two kinds of relationship can be identified within the demobilization role of 
religion for social participation (Turska-Kawa, Wojtasik, 2014, pp. 6–23). First, the sphere of 
religion will always be competitive to social activity, including political activity, and as a result 
it will shift individuals’ interest toward religious issues. This will happen because of a limited 
amount of resources the citizens can allocate to their activity, and engagement in the life of 
the Church will reduce the possibility of activity on other planes of social activity (Wuthnow, 
2003). In addition, high trust in religious institutions may lower trust in other institutions, 
and thus also the general social capital (Uslaner, 2000). The other direction of the analysis 
refers to the level of individuals’ religious dogmatism, on its basis formulating conclusions 
about a negative influence of extreme doctrinal engagement on social participation. On 
the one hand, this results from the relationship between extreme religious engagement and 
the frequency of participating in religious rites, and on the other hand, from the negative 
influence of membership in Church institutions on engaging in secular institutions activity 
(Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard 2003, pp. 318–319). Dietram A. Scheufele, Matthew C. Nisbet and 
Dominique Brossard (Ibidem, p. 319) point out that strong religious engagement co-occurs 
with lower political competence and sense of efficacy in this area. 
Research also shows that religiosity may generate contradictory attitudes at the same 
time. On he one hand, it generates pro-social attitudes (Norenzayan, Shariff 2008; Preston 
et al., 2013), mainly directed at the members of one’s own religious group and aggressive 
toward “outgroups”, especially those that really or symbolically threaten religious and moral 
values (Batson et al., 1999). At the same time, some data demonstrates that in the case of 
negative attitudes toward out groups religion can be a factor preventing actual aggression 
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by referring to values such as e.g., the need of self-control regarding negative emotions or 
impulsive acts (McCullough, Willoughby, 2009). 
Religiosity of Silesians
The boundaries of Silesia have been modified many times. Changes in the state affiliation 
of the area and the resulting territorial transformations definitely had an influence on 
the socio-economic development of the region and contributed to the fusion of different 
national, political, religious and economic systems (Heffner, Solga, 2012, p. 128). Merging 
influences of other nationalities and cultures, mostly Czech, German and Polish, gener-
ated the Silesian identity specific for some of the residents. Some researchers studying the 
Silesian identity observe that it is a blend of different cultures and influences; however, the 
majority of scholars define the core of Silesian identity using three essential values: work, 
family and religiosity.
Hence, religiosity can be considered as a core element of Silesians’ identity. The stable 
position of this value was shaped as early as in the time of industrialization, when religion 
integrated, strengthened and propagated culture. It was a kind of protective umbrella for 
strange influences. Thanks to the work of Catholic priests and their engagement in protecting 
Polish identity, paradoxically laicization processes did not affect Silesia as much as they 
affected many other places in Europe in the time of rapid industrialization and urbaniza-
tion. In the real socialism period, Silesians’ bond with the Catholic Church did not weaken, 
either. Also, the turbulent 1980s only consolidated Silesians’ religious attitudes. The period 
of system transformation and socio-economic changes affected the lives of the residents in 
different ways but they did not weaken their religiosity (Swadźba, 2012).
Research carried out since the beginning of the 21st century proves that despite many 
influences and impacts of other cultures or competitive ideologies and values, religion 
still plays an important role in the life of Silesians. The study by Agata Zygmunt (2008, p. 
58–59) shows that for the vast majority of Silesians religion is very important (46.1%) or 
quite important (36%). The importance of religion in the life of Silesians is proved by 94.8% 
self-declarations of Catholic Church affiliation (Górny, 2008, p. 106). In another study, this 
referred to 95% respondents (Świątkiewicz, 2007, pp. 37–53).
As pointed out by Urszula Swadźba (2014A, p. 62), religious values have special im-
portance in smaller communities where materialist values dominate and the impact of 
institutional religiosity is still strong. However, the author points out that although its role 
is still important, the strength of religiosity is decreasing. Laicization tendencies, referring to 
a part of the middle-aged and young generations, are clear. Religiosity is diversified between 
regions, even in originally Silesian areas. It is stronger in areas where native residents prevail, 
and weaker wherever migration processes are active (Swadźba, 2012, pp. 345–392).
One expression of the liveliness of Silesian religiosity is religious practices. They are part of 
the culture of Silesia, and participating in them is proof of belonging to a religious community. 
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High participation of nearly all individuals declaring Catholic Church affiliation refers to one-
time practices (baptism 98.0%, the First Holy Communion 97.6%). The majority of believers in 
smaller Silesian communities also take part in regular practices. But in big cities the members 
of the young generation, especially men, are departing from institutional religiosity. Daily 
practices have weaker results. The findings of studies carried out in bigger cities show that the 
residents more and more often prefer other, more satisfactory forms of activity on Sundays, 
such as an outing or shopping at the supermarkets (Swadźba, 2012; Swadźba, 2014B, p. 36).
Research Model
The research model involves one independent variable and three dependent variables in 
separate single-variable models. The independent variable is religious engagement. Religi-
osity, understood as a complex structure, including views, beliefs and values concerning 
a religious subject, contributes to specific behaviors: religious practices (Gosztyła, 2010). 
Religiosity manifests itself in specific actions; without them it would be a kind of world 
view, philosophy or ideology (Mariański, 2017, p. 244). In the presented study, we verified 
the scope of this predictor explaining the variation of variables connected with the attitudes 
and engagement of young Silesians in the political sphere: (1) community engagement, (2) 
approval for religion’s interference in the public space, and (3) accepting Catholic Church 
hierarchs’ views on problems such as artificial contraception, homosexual relationships, 
euthanasia and in vitro fertilization. All these variables are the expression of the individual’s 
position in the continuum of socially closed vs socially open attitude. 
The study was oriented at young people due to the fact that, on the one hand, they are 
the most strongly exposed to active liberalization and individualization trends in Europe, 
and on the other hand, they come from families that are historically and socially rooted in 
an environment where religious values play a fundamental role. The study was carried out 
among Silesians, where religion is regarded as one of the basic values and the core of the 
Silesian identity. Their attitudes and opinions are important from the point of view of their 
further participation in the civic and political community. 
The relationships between religious engagement and community activity presented 
in source literature have at least two opposite directions. The first approach stresses the 
mobilization role of religious engagement for social and political activity, enhancing its active 
participation in behaviors oriented at the community. Another view, however, shows religious 
engagement as a factor weakening social and political activity, lowering trust and generally 
being an encumbrance for the social capital. The study is oriented at diagnosing the direction 
and level of this relationship among young Silesians. The other dependent variable in the 
model is the perception of the legitimacy of combining the religious sphere with the public 
one. This issue is specific for Poland, resulting from the chosen discussions and directions 
of activity taken by politicians, also in electoral programmes. I am interested in the level 
of approval for a fusion of these two spheres among young people who are about to obtain 
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their active voting right. The third variable is the perception of legitimacy of the opinions of 
Catholic Church hierarchs on issues connected with values that are also widely discussed in 
the political sphere, such as the attitude to euthanasia, homosexual relationships, artificial 
contraception or in vitro fertilization. It seems that these are specific problems which concern 
young people and arouse their interest. The strong presence of religion in the public sphere 
of Poland also means that these problems are often the object of political discussions in 
which the members of the sacral circle widely express their views, opposing liberal values. 
In this study I did not diagnose the values upheld by young people but their opinions on 
the legitimacy of the general views of Church hierarchs on the discussed problems. We may 
presume that young people can personally be open to liberal values, but their attitude will 
be modified by the opinion of the Church, which is more valuable for them. 
In the study, the mentioned relationships were given the form of the following research 
questions:
 Is religious engagement a significant predictor of young Silesians’ community engage-
ment of young Silesians?
 Is religious engagement a significant predictor of young Silesians’ attitudes to the 
approval of religion’s interference in the public sphere in Poland?
 Is religious engagement a significant predictor of attitudes accepting Catholic Church 
hierarchs’ views on problems such as artificial contraception, euthanasia, homosexual 
relationships and in vitro fertilization?
Methodology
The study was carried out among young people aged 16–19, upper secondary school students 
from Śląskie Province. The respondents were selected using stratified random sampling, 
where the strata were Częstochowa, Bytom, Sosnowiec, Gliwice, Katowice, Tychy, Rybnik 
and Bielsko-Biała sub-regions, and the sampling involved two stages: the choice of school 
and of class. Given the diverse ethnic structure of Silesian Province residents, a purposeful 
criterion was used in the final sampling. The questionnaire included the question “Do you 
regard yourself as a Silesian?”, which served as the ultimate verification of the inclusion 
of participants. Only the questionnaires filled in by people who met all the criteria (the 
random and purposeful ones) were analyzed. Based on the purposeful question, 23 people 
were excluded from the sample. Finally, the sample was composed of 291 women (51.3%) 
and 276 men (48.7%).
Several indicators were introduced in the study, whose analysis was oriented at finding 
the answers to the research questions. 
The religious engagement indicator was constructed on the basis of several statements 
concerning religious activity in different areas: (1) regular participation in Sunday holy mass, 
(2) prayer (individual conversation with God), (3) regular use of the confession sacrament, 
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(4) regular use of the holy communion sacrament. The cafeteria was made up of Likert scale 
responses (I strongly agree, I agree, hard to say, I disagree, I strongly disagree). The reliability 
of the scale, determined with Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, was .62.
The community engagement indicator was constructed as a four-item scale (I actively 
support the activity of non-governmental organizations (foundations, associations etc.); 
I participate in charity activities, I help my neighbors; I am interested in the issues connected 
with my town/commune). The cafeteria was made up of Likert scale responses (I strongly 
agree, I agree, hard to say, I disagree, I strongly disagree). The reliability of the scale, deter-
mined with Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, was .84.
The religion in the public sphere indicator was oriented at the diagnosis of support for 
the interference of the religious sphere in the public one on the basis of several important 
areas: (1) the perception of the words concluding deputies’ oath: “So help me God”, (2) the 
presence of religion as a compulsory subject at school, (3) expecting the President of the 
Republic of Poland to be Catholic, (4) the presence of the cross in the Sejm hall, (5) expecting 
politicians to uphold Catholic values. The reliability of the scale, determined with Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient, was .76.
The approval for the Church’s views indicator was oriented at diagnosing the level of young 
Silesians’ support for Catholic Church hierarchs’ views on problems such as: (1) euthanasia, 
(2) in vitro fertilization, (3) same-sex relationships, (4) access to artificial contraception, 
(5) the use of the “morning after” pill. The cafeteria was made up of Likert scale responses 
(I strongly agree, I agree, hard to say, I disagree, I strongly disagree). The reliability of the 
scale, determined with Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, was .71.
Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables by sex. Generally, in terms of 
religious engagement and religion in the public sphere, the mean values are below the aver-
age. In terms of approval for the Church’s views and community engagement, the values are 
significantly higher. With regard to sex, significant differences were only found in community 
engagement. Women represent a significantly higher level of community engagement than 
men: t(511.955)=4.423; p<.001.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the analyzed variables by sex






Woman 291 2.84 1.05364 .06177
Man 276 2.69 1.01066 .06106
Community 
engagement
Woman 291 4.09 .68299 .04004
Man 276 3.80 .90171 .05428
Religion in the 
public sphere
Woman 291 2.91 .90274 .05292
Man 276 2.81 .86771 .05261
Religious Determinants of Socio-Political Openness of Young Silesians in Poland 93






Woman 291 3.48 .94210 .05523
Man 276 3.37 .92494 .05567
Then, linear relations between the analyzed variables were verified. Table 2 presents Pear-
son’s r correlation coefficients for the independent variable and the dependent variables.




Religion in the public sphere .54**
Accepting the Church’s views .44**
**. Correlation significant at the level of 0.01 (bilaterally).
The verification of the relationship between the independent variable and dependent 
variables showed a significant relationship of the predictor only with religion in the public 
sphere and accepting the Church’s views. The relationship between religious engagement and 
community engagement proved to be statistically insignificant, which meant there was the 
reason for performing univariate regression analysis for this part of the model.
Next, regression analysis was performed in single-variable models. For religious en-
gagement as a predictor of religion in the public sphere, R squared statistic was obtained 
at the level of .30, which means that this variable explains 30% of variance. This model 
is statistically significant, the value of F statistics is F(1; 561)=242.115; p<.001 (Table 3). 
Religious engagement also proved to be a significant predictor of the approval for the vies 
expressed by Catholic Church hierarchs concerning problems such as euthanasia, artificial 
contraception, homosexual relationships and in vitro fertilization; F(1; 563)=135.019 p<.001. 
In this model, R squared value was .193, which means that religious engagement explains 
19.3% of variance of the approval for the views Church hierarchs (Table 3). 
Table 3. Estimation of regression coefficients in single-variable models with the predictor of 
religious engagement
Non-standardized coefficients Standardized coefficients T Signifi-cance
B, D Standard error Beta
Religion in the public sphere
(constant) 7.764 .448 17.313 .000
Religious engagement .482 .031 .549 15.560 .000
Views of Catholic Church hierarchs
(constant) 22.935 .497 46.123 .000
Religious engagement .398 .034 .440 11.620 .000
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Discussion and Conclusions
The aim of the presented study was to diagnose the role of religious engagement in the social 
attitudes of young Silesians, operationalized on the continuum of closeness vs openness in 
three areas: (1) community engagement, (2) approval for religion’s interference in the public 
space, and (3) accepting Catholic Church hierarchs’ views on problems such as euthanasia, 
artificial contraception, homosexual relationships and in vitro fertilization.
First of all, the predictor of young Silesians’ religious engagement is below the mean value 
of the scale used in the study. Thus, weaker religiosity of Silesians follows the nationwide 
trend diagnosed since the 1990s. In this tendency, the proportion of believers is slowly 
decreasing, while the proportion of indecisive ones and unbelievers is growing (Młodzież, 
2016). In addition, a gradual decrease in the level of youths’ participation in masses, services 
and other religious meetings is observable (e.g., weekly participation has dropped from 
55% in 1996 to 32% in 2016). In 2016, in comparison to 2013, adolescents’ attendance at 
religion lessons at school dropped by 11 percentage points in rural areas, by 17 percentage 
points among small towns and by as much as 24 percentage points in big cities. The latest 
report by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) “Młodzież 2016” shows that currently, 
young Poles are less willing to establish families and live in accordance with the principles 
of their religion and more willing to pursue professional successes. A study by Janusz 
Mariański (2017, p. 226) proves that religion can no longer be regarded as subjectively 
important for a part of Polish youths; it no longer belongs to the world they experience. 
Irena Borowik (2016, p. 11–12) points to the following symptoms of changes in religiosity 
in adolescent circles: a) lower participation in Sunday services, neglecting confession and 
the holy communion, fewer new priests and monks; b) the model of religiosity of young 
women becoming similar to that of young men. The indices of religiosity of young women 
under the age of 30 have been decreasing more quickly than those of men of the same 
age, which may in the future affect the processes of religious socialization in the family; c) 
adolescents engage in the activity of atheistic, rationalistic and humanistic associations more 
often that adults do; sometimes they openly protest against the practices of the Catholic 
Church that make it difficult to leave it completely; d) young people have a critical view of 
the Church as an institution, the clergy, as well as religious instructors, pointing out their 
reluctance to engage in discussions, providing ready solutions, and the rigidity of the whole 
religious message.
Low religious engagement among young Silesians, i.e. people coming from the envi-
ronment where religiosity is considered as one of the most important values, generates 
new exploration questions. We found out that despite the stable thesis that the closest 
environment (the family) has the greatest impact on the development of customs and 
upholding religious traditions, young Silesians do not display high religious engagement. 
This may result from two things, which need to be studied more thoroughly. First, perhaps 
the core of the identity of Silesians should be verified anew, allowing to separate values from 
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religious principles in Silesian families? Second, perhaps the competition between religious 
values and modern/liberal values is won by the latter ones, which have an equally strong 
influence e.g., through the media as through the family? Maybe Silesian religiosity is more 
and more subject to processes of individualization and pluralization. According to Janusz 
Mariański (2006, p. 12): “Polarization into the private sphere and the public sphere leads to 
the loss of importance of religion in social dimensions. It is becoming the matter of choice, 
preference and personal taste, and in the public sphere it is losing its general normative 
power. Religiosity that is in a way filtered through individualized subjectivity and personal 
pursuits becomes relative, loses the clear church boundaries and especially the authoritarian 
aspects. These individualization processes often mean the departure from institutionalized 
orthodoxy toward the selectivity or privatization of religious beliefs.” 
Three research questions were posed as part of the research procedure. The first one 
referred to diagnosing the significance of religious engagement in community engagement 
of young Silesians. The analysis did not show any significant relationships between the 
variables. It is worth stressing, however, that community engagement of the respondents 
was relatively high, especially as compared with the lower degree of religious engagement. 
It was significantly higher for women (4.09) than for men (3.79). In comparison to the 
results of other nationwide studies, Silesian youths represent a high level of engagement. 
Research shows that against the background of other nationalities, Polish youths are the 
most optimistic in their perception of social problems, but are the least willing to engage 
in activity for the benefit of the society (Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz, Zalewska, 2010). Only one 
tenth of upper secondary school students declare that being useful for others is among their 
important life goals (Boguszewski, Kowalczuk, 2014). Young people display low engage-
ment in regular activity of non-governmental organizations and voluntary organizations, 
although they are likely to take part in occasional projects (Siegień, 2010). A more recent 
study by Beata Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz and Anna M. Zalewska (2015) shows that against the 
background of other nations, Polish youths display stronger passive citizenship (the sense 
of patriotism, respect for national symbols and loyalty to the state) and lower engagement 
in politics; they are slightly less willing to act toward change, although in comparison to 
other nationalities they are more socially involved. 
In the study by Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz and Zalewska (ibidem), four groups of young 
Poles were identified. The first one is Political Activists, for whom politics is an element 
of strong engagement and who have the sense of national affiliation, want to participate 
in elections and act for the benefit of the community. They are a group with high civic 
potential. Unfortunately, its size decreases with age and at the age of 18 the group is rather 
small. The second one is Apolitical Activists, who also represent an above-average level 
of engagement but are uninterested in political issues. The size of this group only slightly 
decreases with age, and it is the largest identified group of young people. The third group, 
Alienated Politicians, apart from politics display little engagement in other activities. They 
have a poor civic potential. The size of the group also decreases with age. The last group, 
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Alienated Individualists, is made up of people with the lowest level of community activity 
and above-average engagement in their own development. Their number grows with age. The 
study showed that eleven- and fourteen-year-olds declare a much higher level of readiness 
to act for the benefit of their community and engage in broadly understood politics. The 
closer they are to the moment of obtaining active voting right, the lower is their level of 
political engagement. 
The second question referred to the diagnosis of significance of religious engagement 
for young Silesians’ approval for religion’s interference in politics. The analysis showed 
significant relationships between the variables: religious engagement explains 30% of the 
variable religion in the public sphere. This means that religious engagement is a significant 
predictor of the approval for religion’s interference in the political sphere. The study confirms 
the findings of the CBOS report (Młodzież, 2016), which show that 27% of people who often 
engage in religious practices are of the opinion that the Catholic Church should have a special 
impact on law establishment. People who practised more often also displayed a higher 
level of support for organizations such as the National Radical Camp and All-Polish Youth, 
extremely rightist political groups for young people which propagate nationalistic values. 
Another report (CBOS, 2015A) referring to the society as a whole shows almost universal 
support for the presence of crosses in public buildings, no objection to religion lessons at 
school and support for the religious character of military oath. Besides, the respondents are 
not against the consecration of public utility buildings and other places by priests or against 
priests’ and bishops’ participation in state celebrations. Approximately three fourths of the 
respondents declare they have nothing against priests appearing on public TV. However, in 
the case of the Church expressing its views on acts adopted by the Sejm or priests telling 
people how to vote in elections, the situation is the opposite: the majority do not approve of 
this. Basically, attitudes approving of religion in the political space are more often manifested 
by people who are believers or even deeply devout and who regularly take part in religious 
practices. 
The aim of the third question was to diagnose the significance of religious engagement 
for the level of young Silesians’ acceptance of Catholic Church hierarchs’ views on problems 
such as euthanasia, artificial contraception, homosexual relationships and in vitro fertiliza-
tion. Religious engagement proved to be a significant predictor of approval for the views 
expressed by Catholic Church hierarchs on the mentioned issues: religious engagement 
explains 19.3% variance of the accepting the views of Church hierarchs. 
This is consistent with research results presented in source literature, quite consistently 
finding that higher religious engagement is related to the approval for values connected 
with the social order and objection to values referring to changes and the questioning of 
the established rules (e.g. Saroglou, Delpierre & Dernelle, 2004; Roccas, 2005; Brzozowski, 
2007). This approach may result from the principles of most major religions of the world, 
postulating self-control and restraint in pursuing pleasures and recommending moderation 
at the level of biological life. In a CBOS study, three-fifths of the respondents approved of 
Religious Determinants of Socio-Political Openness of Young Silesians in Poland 97
Church representatives expressing their views on subjects concerning morality and social 
life (CBOS, 2015B).
The results of the current study confirm that religious engagement is a significant predic-
tor of a closed social attitude in two out of three areas proposed in the model. It significantly 
explains the approval for religion’s interference in the public sphere. Higher religious engage-
ment promotes the desire to incorporate the approved religious principles into the secular 
space. This may result from fear of liberalization of this apace and popularization of values 
threatening the individual. It may also prove the pursuit of higher sense of security, which 
will definitely be stronger if one is surrounded by familiar and predictable values. Religious 
engagement is also a significant predictor of acceptance of Catholic Church hierarchs’ views 
on problems such as artificial contraception, euthanasia, homosexual relationships and in 
vitro fertilization. It is the expression of consistency of the religious attitude, which agrees 
with the Church’s teaching. Interestingly, relationships between religious engagement and 
community activity of young Silesians were not confirmed. This opens a new space for the 
search of determinants of this activity in other areas, especially that a strong element of 
community virtue was diagnosed in this group. The contemporary social transformations 
go in different directions and have different intensity. Traditions concerning religion are 
being modified all the time, and thus, perhaps new forms of what is religious and spiritual 
are developing. Young Silesians do not escape nationwide liberalization tendencies, although 
in their case the tendencies progress more slowly.
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